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Even though Vermont was spared the massive surge of COVID-19 experienced in other states, we 
witnessed similar troubling COVID-19 outbreaks at long-term care facilities (LTC).  Two skilled nursing 
facilities (SNF) in Chittenden County were particularly impacted: Burlington Health and Rehabilitation 
(BH&R) and Birchwood Terrace (Birchwood).  At the time of this writing residents at these two facilities 
accounted for 32/55 (58%) of COVID-19-related deaths in Vermont. The University of Vermont Medical 
Center (UVMMC), Vermont’s only tertiary academic hospital, collaborated with BH&R and Birchwood to 
assist with outbreak management, a process which required partnerships with numerous other entities 
across our rural region. The Operations and Transitions of Care (TOC) branch of UVMMC’s COVID-19 
Incident Command provided administrative support for this response.  
SNF residents are a highly vulnerable population.  BH&R and Birchwood house a mix of residents receiving 
short-term rehabilitation following medical illness or surgery, and those requiring long- term care for 
conditions such as dementia.  While residents vary in overall health status, many are elderly, frail, and 
medically complex.  Any acute illness in this congregate population can deteriorate into a life-threatening 
event.  As we are all now aware, COVID-19 is a particularly devastating illness. 
The purpose of this report is to share our experience in responding to the COVID-19 crisis, including data, 
successes, challenges, and recommendations from lessons learned.  Our hope is that this report will serve 
as an educational tool for LTC facilities as they prepare for future COVID-19 outbreaks. We also hope that 
it will highlight the importance of collaboration, as outbreaks at one facility impact people and 
organizations far beyond the facility’s walls.  
In preparing this report, we sought the input of key stakeholders, including facility leadership, nursing, 
geriatrics, palliative care, and the TOC team.  The report combines the shared experience of our many 
clinical, operational, emotional, and ethical dilemmas.  It is an honest account of how a diverse health 
care team responded to crises at critical locations in our care continuum, and an illustration of how we all 
share in the honor of caring for our community. 
  
BH&R FACTSHEET 
Location 300 Pearl Street Burlington, VT 
Total beds 126 
Services provided Subacute rehab, long-term care, neurologic care, 
respite care, PT, OT, SLP, orthopedic rehab, audiology 
care, dementia care, wound care, pain management, IV 
therapy, heparin therapy, hospice care, and x-rays 
Ownership Genesis Healthcare 
Provider staffing model Mix of embedded physician and advance practice 
provider (APP) team employed by Genesis and part-
time embedded physician team employed by UVMMC 
Physical layout High-rise/ floors with elevator access.  Mix of single 
and shared rooms. 
Outbreak dates First COVID-19 case: 3/16/20 
COVID-19-free: 5/7/20 
Number of COVID-19 cases: residents 39 
Number of COVID-19-related deaths: residents 11 
Resident death location 8 deaths at BH&R, 3 at UVMMC 
Number of COVID-19 cases: employees 28 
Number of COVID-19-related deaths: employees 0 
 
BIRCHWOOD FACTSHEET 
Location 43 Starr Farm Road Burlington, VT 
Total beds 144 
Services provided Subacute rehab, long-term care, Alzheimer’s and 
Dementia care on a secure memory care unit, respite 
care, PT, OT, SLP, advanced wound care, IV therapy, 
post-stroke care, hospice care, oncology care, cardiac 
care, trach care, enteral nutrition, orthopedic 
rehabilitation, and bedside lab and x-ray 
Ownership Birchwood Operations, LLC 
Provider staffing model Embedded geriatric-trained physicians and APPs 
employed by UVMMC 
Physical layout Single level, long hallways off main entrance.  Mix of 
single and shared rooms. 
Outbreak dates First COVID-19 case: 3/30/20 
COVID-19 free: 5/28/20 
Number of COVID-19 cases: residents 60 lab confirmed, 32 presumed positive 
Number of COVID-19-related deaths: residents 20 lab confirmed, 1 presumed positive 
Resident death location All at Birchwood 
Number of COVID-19 cases: employees 25 Birchwood staff, 5 additional contracted employees 
Number of COVID-19-related deaths: employees 0 
SUCCESSES AND CHALLENGES 
It is not easy to tell the story of these two outbreaks.  Common themes have emerged, but each outbreak 
had its own character and indelible anecdotes.  Individual narratives differed, each irretrievably colored 
by the stress, chaos, exhaustion and grief common to crisis management.  In the end, we elected to tell 
this story in terms of successes and challenges.  
Successes:  
Advanced care planning:  
Prior to the first COVID-19 case at either facility, physicians and APPs met with every resident and 
surrogate to discuss the reality of COVID-19. This included an overview of what we knew of the disease, 
how we planned to protect the residents, and detailed value-centered conversations about what their 
wishes would be should they become infected. Advanced care planning formed the basis of our response 
and there was universal agreement that we would have been rudderless without it. 
Care in place: 
In our advanced care planning we learned that the majority of residents preferred to remain in their 
facility, even in the face of decline and death. This was particularly true of long-term care residents, who 
considered the facility their home and their caregivers their family.  Understanding this priority, we geared 
our response to honor the residents’ wishes whenever possible.  This is supported by the data: 29/32 
(90.6%) of resident COVID-19-related deaths occurred at the facility level.  Maintaining care in place was 
not without its costs and challenges.   
Strong collaboration, sense of community: 
Strong collaboration and teamwork are cornerstones of successful crisis management. UVMMC has a 
long-standing collaborative relationship with both BH&R and Birchwood. This is based in part  on our 
staffing arrangement and buoyed more recently by the UVMMC Transition of Care team, who over the 
past two years have partnered with both facilities to improve systems of care. Team members know each 
other well and have a shared sense of trust and dedication.  The Vermont Department of Health, State 
and City of Burlington leadership, UVM Health Network Home Health & Hospice, and local transportation 
services were just some of the key partners that stepped forward to offer high-functioning inter-
professional support. Crises bond people together and as one facility APP noted, their “sense of 
community and family never felt stronger.”  
Challenges:  
The disease: Perhaps the greatest challenge was managing a disease that the world had never seen 
before. There was little data, no evidence-based guidelines, and a great deal of misinformation.  
Ultimately it was impossible to know what to expect and how to plan.  Several times we were forced to 
make emergent decisions based on what we knew in the moment, only to reverse them shortly thereafter. 
As one UVMMC leader noted, we were – along with the rest of the world –“in the dark.” This was a major 
contributor to the stress and chaos we all experienced. The popular conception was that COVID-19 
presented with fever, shortness of breath, and cough.  However, many presented with more vague 
symptoms, such as lethargy, weakness, falls, poor oral intake, behavior changes, nausea, diarrhea and 
headache.  We now recognize loss of taste or smell as a cardinal symptom of COVID-19, but it was new to 
us then. 
Disease progression was also unpredictable, particularly the often abrupt transition from clinically stable 
to actively dying. One provider termed it “going over the respiratory cliff.” This aligns with webinars from 
the University of Washington (Seattle) and Mount Sinai (New York) which stress the importance of not 
underestimating the potential speed and intensity of dyspnea in COVID-19.  Simultaneously managing 
multiple residents in this phase required enhanced staffing, rapid access to medications, and an endless 
supply of compassion.  At Birchwood, additional staffing was provided by the UVMMC Division of Palliative 
Medicine, who partnered with the UVMMC Geriatrics Division to provide inter-professional 24/7 in-facility 
care for five weeks. As detailed below, UVMMC also augmented nurse staffing. Changes were also 
required to the pharmacy formulary, as subcutaneous opioids were found to be especially helpful in 
managing critical dyspnea due to their faster onset and as an alternative route of administration.  
Unclear accountability: Despite strong commitment from all involved, neither outbreak witnessed ideal 
response times. Particularly early on, confusion arose about whether responsibility to marshal resources 
rested with institutional owners, the Governor, the Vermont Department of Health, Vermont National 
Guard, UVMMC, or some mixture of the above. More than one direct responder, including those in 
leadership positions, indicated they felt it was unclear whom to ask for help, with some leveraging 
personal connections for support. Some requests for help were deferred from one source of authority to 
another. Ultimately an outstanding team comprised of key leaders in UVMMC Incident Command, with 
collaborating leaders in Geriatrics, Family Medicine, Palliative Care and staff from each facility emerged. 
While that team eventually met the many challenging operational and clinical problems required to 
manage the crisis, multiple caregivers raised concerns that quality suffered as a result of the delays of this 
ad hoc process. 
Visitation limitations: in an effort to minimize infection risk to their residents, LTC facilities across the 
state prohibited visitors from entering the building. While most agreed this was a necessary action, it was 
emotionally devastating for the residents and their loved ones. Staff, too, felt deep ambivalence about 
visitation restrictions – and as a result often served as surrogate family, a dynamic that was emotionally 
draining.  They offered alternative means of family communication such as video chats, but this was a 
time-consuming process that further stretched an already thin staff. 
Infection control: infection control was a major undertaking at both facilities.  In some the instances the 
physical layout of the facility made separation of COVID-positive/negative areas difficult. This resulted in 
the need for COVID-free outdoor spaces for Palliative Medicine staff (in our case a camper van) and 
resident relocation. Resident relocation consisted of discharge home (particularly for stable short-term 
rehab patients), relocation within the facility, or relocation to an outside facility.  
During the BH&R outbreak, UVMMC was asked by state leadership to emergently relocate short-term 
rehabilitation patients thought to be COVID-negative, to protect them from becoming infected.  UVMMC 
partnered with the Doubletree Hotel in South Burlington and over the day designated staff, obtained 
supplies, and modified rooms to make relocation possible.  Unfortunately, following the move of the first 
five patients, we discovered that a BH&R staff member who’d had contact with the patients was COVID-
positive, and relocated patients – who were now considered Persons Under Investigation (PUIs) -  could 
not remain at the hotel due to the lack of negative pressure rooms.  All five patients were subsequently 
hospitalized and the project was shut down.  Hand-off communication during these multiple moves was 
rushed and in some instances lacking critical information that could have altered decision-making. 
Complete infection control was nearly impossible on dementia units, as some residents were unable to 
comply with isolation, masking, and distancing.  Maintaining staff hand sanitizer stations on the unit was 
also problematic due to the risks they posed to cognitively impaired residents.  Overly restrictive tactics 
such as sedation and restraints were not used, as they were felt to put residents at even greater risk and 
not aligned with the residents’ goals of care.  This was a difficult balance for some family and community 
members to appreciate and required frequent re-explanation. 
Special situations: while both anticipatory advance care planning and urgent serious illness decision-
making were extremely helpful, several clinical situations were particularly difficult to anticipate and 
navigate. Residents receiving hemodialysis required transportation to and from a dialysis unit for ongoing 
life-sustaining treatment, yet transportation services personnel were concerned about exposure.  Some 
residents required aerosolizing therapies such as continuous positive airway pressure (CPAP) and 
nebulizers, which created a higher risk of infection transmission. Continued CPAP use in COVID-positive 
patients prompted a recommendation for placement in a negative pressure room, which was not available 
at either facility.  This led to an emergent risk-benefit analysis of hospitalization solely for CPAP 
continuation versus temporary discontinuation of CPAP.  Several residents were hospitalized before the 
matter could be reviewed by UVMMC experts in Pulmonary Medicine, Critical Care, and Ethics (Appendix 
A). 
Staffing: while we anticipated the need to provide surge and relief staffing during the outbreaks, 
execution was problematic. At BH&R, UVMMC was responsible for staffing a subset of patients with 
partially-embedded UVMMC physicians, while the parent company Genesis provided staffing for the 
majority of patients. As the crisis unfolded, several UVMMC employed physicians and facility-employed 
APPs were quarantined, leaving the bulk of the medical care to the facility Medical Director alone.  Surge 
plans were not in place at that time to provide assistance. 
At Birchwood, patients were primarily under the care of UVMMC-employed geriatric physicians and APPs.  
Surge plans were in place at the time of their outbreak, but they were enacted in a manner that did not 
always mitigate provider exhaustion.  Replacement of experienced SNF providers with less experienced 
surge providers was also done all at once and without adequate orientation, leaving the facility to educate 
replacement providers on important workflow details, such as use of their electronic health record.   
UVMMC also supplemented the Birchwood nursing pool with UVMMC-employed staff and contracted 
travel nurses until the Birchwood staff were able to return to the workforce. Though well-intended, 
differences in clinical workflows and work environment created an additional layer of stress for the 
supplemental staff. Specifically, UVMMC staff were not acclimated to caring for non-acute care patients 
and the standards of care varied in areas such as the electronic health record and medication 
reconciliation.  
An additional challenge was determining an appropriate nursing-resident ratio.  In normal circumstances 
it’s common for LTC facilities to have nursing-resident ratios that far exceed those of hospitals, but given 
the acuity of illness and magnitude of residents affected, additional staffing was required to approximate 
the acute care environment.  This was complicated by the number of COVID-positive Birchwood staff, 
which limited their ability to provide orientation to incoming UVMMC staff. 
Testing: at the time of the outbreaks, COVID-19 testing was in its infancy.  Local testing guidelines 
frequently shifted, making it difficult to know who to test and when.  Some advocated for testing of all 
residents and staff, while others preferred to test only those at risk due to symptoms or suspicious 
contacts.  Residents with cognitive impairment had an especially hard time with the discomfort of testing 
procedures.  Administering tests was further limited by shortages in testing supplies and qualified staff to 
perform swabbing.  At BH&R, swabbing was relegated to the Medical Director.  Once tested, we were 
further limited by slow test turnaround, and the difficulty of interpreting negative results, particularly in 
residents with high pre-test probabilities. 
Decedent planning: Care for and removal of deceased residents also proved to be an issue, as funeral 
home employees were concerned about entering the building due to infection risk. Consequently, staff 
members were required to perform some tasks they found distressing, such as covering residents’ faces 
and securing their bodies in sheets or pouches.  New protocols were needed to ensure safe, respectful 
preparation of and transfer of decedents. 
Culture: while collaboration between our hospital and facilities was a major key to providing care, inter-
institutional differences in culture influenced team members’ ability to optimally respond. As one facility 
leader put it: “In general, I feel most individuals have little understanding of the amount of work that 
occurs in a SNF, at any level.  It is not glorious or sexy to say you work in a nursing home. This is not a 
setting in which we get much praise or credit for the work we do, and it is not expected.  Yet LTC is unique, 
and those of us who choose to work in it find it a privilege.  There were several instances in which the 
facility staff were made to feel less valued/valuable than UVMMC staff, which I am certain was not the 
intention.” Future collaborators should be aware of these sensitivities. 
Grief and well-being: it’s impossible to overstate the need for psycho-emotional support in a crisis of this 
magnitude. Even with improved access to medications, one geriatrician noted that residents sometimes 
progressed so quickly that holding their hand was the best they could offer.  In order to better support 
staff well-being, the inter-professional team at Birchwood introduced “The Pause” bedside ceremony 
(Appendix B) following a resident’s death and supported an Institutional Ceremony of Remembering 
following the outbreak. Facility staff noted that these helped them cope, but also acknowledged that there 
was substantial residual emotional and spiritual trauma. Ultimately, we did not anticipate the breadth and 
depth of grief support needed for front line health care workers, nor did we plan sufficiently to maintain 
provider well-being.  
  
RECOMMENDATIONS 
The following comprehensive list of recommendations is based on our experience and review post-
outbreak. 
Define a clear system of stakeholder accountability and communication for outbreak responses:  
 Prepare as if you will experience an outbreak 
 Identify data-based response triggers, such as the # of COVID-19 cases in your community 
 Communicate with local health care leaders, the Department of Health, and other key 
stakeholders to review your community resources and develop areas of collaboration. 
Understand that outbreaks at one facility impact people and organizations far beyond the 
facility’s walls  
Define stakeholder roles and responsibilities, with specific deliverables: 
 Facility leadership, including ownership, Medical Director, and Director of Nursing: educate staff, 
ensure infection control, provide personal protective equipment (PPE), ensure adequate staffing, 
prepare and deliver expedited orientation for potential additional staffing and ensure key 
functional workflows such as pharmacy support are in place 
 Local health care leaders appropriate for your community, such as referring hospital Chief Medical 
Officer, Chief Operating Officer, or Transitions of Care expert: provide additional support for the 
above processes as indicated, with particular consideration of offering expertise in key specialty 
areas such as Infectious Disease and Palliative Medicine 
 Department of Health: ensures case tracking and policy guidance 
 State leadership: intervenes as needed, mobilizes large scale operational support such as the 
National Guard 
Identify assigned communication point individuals for each stakeholder group 
 Share organizational policies, procedures, and protocols critical to ensuring inter-organizational 
awareness and collaboration 
 Establish frequent stakeholder check-ins 
 Ask that leaders remain committed in the face of adversity to better understanding each other’s 
perspectives. This is critical to building trust. 
 
Address advance care planning: 
 Initiate value-centered discussions with all residents and surrogates.  Discussions should include  
identification of health care agent, wishes around code status, potential need for a higher level of 
treatment, and the residents’ wishes for end-of-life care should they become infected with 
COVID-19 
 Document care plans in a manner that is accessible to all staff and providers 
 If the patient is already receiving dialysis, plan for dialysis arrangements in the face of an outbreak. 
This includes communication with dialysis units and transportation 
 Assess the risks and benefits of continued nebulizer therapy for COVID-positive and PUI patients, 
considering temporary discontinuation of therapy in selected patients 
 Assess the risks and benefits of continued CPAP/BiPAP therapy for COVID-positive and PUI 
patients, considering temporary discontinuation of therapy in selected patients for 14 days (see 
appendix 1) 
 Update care plans as indicated for changing clinical situations 
 
Assess ability to provide care in place: 
 Anticipate that many residents will want to remain in the facility, even in the face of life-
threatening illness. This may be especially true for the long-term care residents 
 If indicated, collaborate with on-site specialists and be sure to establish clear protocols between 
primary teams and consultants regarding responsibilities. Establish a communication plan for 
ongoing collaboration 
 Consider telemedicine options to access specialists who are not available to assist on site 
 Assess if local home health, public health, and/or local hospice agencies are available to partner 
in care 
 Establish a relationship with your local hospital’s transitions of care experts to assist in operational 
efforts around COVID-19 care and potential movement of residents 
 If you anticipate being unable to provide care in place for COVID-19 residents, communicate with 
local hospital leaders to collaborate on other arrangements  
 
Visitation: 
 Understand the loss of visitation will cause considerable resident, family, and staff distress 
 Prioritize alternative means of communication for patients and loved one, such as video chats and 
speaker phones.  Be sure to use a device that can be easily positioned for residents lying in bed 
 Establish scheduled communication times, which may decrease family and resident anxiety  
 Consider identifying one staff member or team to coordinate communication 
 
COVID-19 education: 
 Review COVID-19 educational resources at your State Department of Health website and/or with 
local experts 
 Take additional time to review the wide range of COVID-19 clinical presentations 
 Understand that our collective knowledge of COVID-19 is rapidly evolving, with frequent changes 
in guidelines and recommendations.  Daily updates may be required in the midst of an outbreak 
 
Infection prevention and control: 
 Consider formal consultation with infection control experts to assess potential points of 
vulnerability in your facility and/or processes 
 Ensure adequate PPE and what measures will be taken if supplies run low 
 Ensure N-95 mask fit testing for all staff 
 Ensure staff training and clearly designated areas for donning and doffing PPE 
 Examine your physical layout for risky contamination areas such as common entry points.  Every 
structure has a security weakness 
For residents: 
 Discharge stable residents home, with particular focus on short-term rehabilitation residents 
 Designate clear areas for COVID-positive/PUI residents within the facility 
 Consider relocation of selected patients to alternative facilities based on COVID status and care 
needs, taking into consideration that complicated skilled nursing care plans are challenging to re-
create elsewhere.  Keep in mind that relocating residents with cognitive impairment may be 
especially problematic 
 Assess the risks and benefits of aggressive isolation techniques for residents with cognitive 
impairment or other disorders that make compliance with infection control measures challenging 
For staff: 
 If COVID-positive/PUI staff will continue to work, designate separate areas for each and identify 
which responsibilities are most appropriate for COVID-positive staff (for example, working with 
COVID-positive residents) 
 Ensure there is adequate space for staff restrooms, eating, and breaks that separates COVID-
positive and COVID-negative staff.  
 Consider use of outdoor spaces such as handwashing stations, tents, sheds, and campers, making 
sure they comply with local zoning regulations 
Returning residents to the facility: 
 Develop protocols consistent with current State Department of Health guidelines regarding when 




 Anticipate the need to augment or replace staff due to work volume, work intensity, illness, 
and/or exhaustion. Specifically consider smaller nursing-resident ratios, especially if caring for 
COVID-positive patients at the facility with end-of-life care needs. 
 Develop specific surge staffing plans at all levels, including physician, APP, nursing, and 
environmental services 
 Ahead of deployment, orient surge staffing to facility workflow details, such as medical record use 
and medication administration protocols 
 Consider assigning a mentor or preceptor to each new staff member 
 Include LTC facility cultural awareness in your orientation plans, especially for those with little LTC 
facility experience 
 Enact surge plans proactively to prevent provider exhaustion and burnout  
 Rotate replacement of experienced LTC providers with surge providers in a manner that always 
leaves at least one experienced provider on site at all times 
 
COVID-19 symptom management and end-of-life care: 
 Understand that patients with COVID-19 can deteriorate rapidly, likely creating the need for 
additional staffing and rapid access to pharmacologic agents 
 Review staff competence and comfort in providing end-of-life care, including pharmacologic and 
non-pharmacologic interventions (see Appendix C for educational resources) 
 Review the  pharmacy formulary and ability to access critical medications within minutes 
 Make sure there are alternative routes of medication administration on site such as subcutaneous 
opioids, which can be especially helpful for managing critical dyspnea due to quicker onset and as 
a replacement for oral medications in residents with thick, frothy secretions 
 Review state and DEA medication waiver programs. For example, depending on your 
circumstances it may be possible to designate your facility as a hospital site with access to your 
local hospital DEA 
 Consider collaboration with the local home health, hospice resources regarding medication 
availability and administration abilities 
 Review ability to provide oxygen, including the use of concentrators for higher than usual flow 
levels 
 Establish the practice of a brief reflection or “pause” at the time of death 
Decedent planning:  
 Establish protocols for preparing decedents’ bodies and allowing respectful transfer. Involve 
facility staff in discussion of the post-death protocol and share ideas about ways to honor the 
person during body preparation and procession 
 Consider the need for a stretcher or other dignified mode of transportation from the resident's 
room to the funeral home pick-up location 
 Ensure all measures meet the funeral home’s infection control requirements 
 
Grief, trauma, and the aftermath: 
 Anticipate that all health care workers involved in an outbreak will need emotional, spiritual, and 
grief support 
 Provide education on the effect of traumatic stress and the strategies staff can adopt to support 
resilience 
 Create an environment in which staff feels that patient wishes are understood, their symptoms 
are well controlled, their death is marked with a moment of honor, and the body is cared for with 
dignity 
 Proactively arrange grief counseling.  Do not rely on the health care worker to arrange it for 
themselves.  Utilize local mental health experts and spiritual professionals as appropriate 
 Encourage community partners to display support for those caring for the people inside the 
facility. This will counterbalance the social isolation, stigmatization and sense of abandonment 
that can cause lasting harm to front line professionals 
 Arrange debriefing sessions for emotional support, feedback, and, lessons learned 
 Create a plan for grieving residents, with special attention to their sense of isolation and to those 
who have lost a friend 
 
CONCLUSION  
We’d like to conclude with four key takeaways: 
 Prepare as if you will face an outbreak 
 Designate an individual to lead the response 
 Advance care planning with residents steers the entire ship 
 Decide what you can and can’t do to honor your residents’ wishes and act accordingly 
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Subcommittee of Clinical Branch of Incident Command  April 3, 2020 
 
Purpose of Meeting: Emergent meeting to address validity of chronic CPAP as an independent indication 
for hospital admission of a COVID-positive patient or resident of skilled nursing facility 
 
Participants (all members of Clinical Branch of Incident Command) 
Mark Pasanen, MD, Hospitalist Director 
Gil Allen, MD, Branch Commander, Clinical Branch of Incident Command 
Mary Ellen Antkowiak, MD, Pulmonologist and Pulmonary Hypertension Specialist  
Brad Holcomb, Director Respiratory Care 
Mark Hamlin, MD, Medical Director of Respiratory Care 
Tim Lahey, MD, Director of Ethics and Infectious Diseases Physician (via post hoc review) 
Situation: Two patients were admitted to UVMMC on 4/2/2020 from Birchwood SNF on the grounds that 
COVID-19-infected patients on CPAP must be managed in a negative pressure environment. 
 
Decisional assumptions that were evaluated: 
1. COVID-positive SNF residents on CPAP will generate aerosolized virus and increase risk of spread 
if not kept in negative pressure room.  
2. COVID-positive SNF residents cannot safely engage in a 7-to-14-day holiday from CPAP while 
recovering from COVID-19 infection. 
 
Verdict regarding assumptions: 
1. Evidence for increased risk of spread from CPAP is lacking.1 
a. Group could neither confirm or reject assumption of potential increased risk of spread 
through CPAP. 
2. Assumption that patients cannot take 7-to -14-day holiday from CPAP while recovering from 
COVD is not substantiated by anecdotal and research-based evidence: 
a. Anecdotal/clinical precedent for interruption of chronic CPAP: 
i. Patients typically wait weeks to months for PSG testing in the community. 
ii. Patients frequently take self-prescribed holidays from CPAP. 
iii. If CPAP machines break down, patients typically can wait weeks awaiting repairs 
without “loaner” machines from DME suppliers. 
b. Published research 
i. Some data suggest many do not have recurrence of OSA during first four to 14 
days of CPAP interruption2 
ii. Data exist demonstrating mild increases in blood pressure and heart rate during 
CPAP interruptions, but no significant microvascular consequences3 or 
reductions in myocardial perfusion (after 14 days).4  
3. Ethical Considerations: hospital admissions should occur only when medically necessary, 
particularly during the COVID-19 pandemic when hospital resources are being diverted to 
address a surge of unstable community patients.  
 
Consensus Verdict: Patients can safely interrupt CPAP for 7-14-days while potentially contagious with 
COVID-19 in order to reduce the risk of transmission without requiring admission to the hospital, the latter 
being associated with added risk of exposure to health care workers and the reduced hospital capacity to 
care for patients with otherwise clearer indications for hospital admission. 
 
Citations: 
1. Tran K, et al.  Aerosol Generating Procedures and Risk of Transmission of Acute Respiratory 
Infections to Healthcare Workers: A Systematic Review. PLoS ONE 2012; 7(4): e35797. 
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0035797 
2. Rossi VA, et al.  Is continuous positive airway pressure necessarily an everyday therapy in 
patients with obstructive sleep apnoea? Eur Respir J 2014; 43: 1387–1393 | DOI: 
10.1183/09031936.00180213 
3. Schwartz EI, et al.  Physiological consequences of CPAP therapy withdrawal in patients with 
obstructive sleep apnoea—an opportunity for an efficient experimental model. J Thorac Dis 
2018; 10(Suppl 1): S24-S32 
4. Schwartz EI, et al. Effect of CPAP Withdrawal on myocardial perfusion in OSA: A randomized 





What is it? 
The medical Pause is a practice implemented after the death of a patient. This practice offers 
closure for the medical team and the patient. It is a means of transitioning and demarcating the 
brevity and importance of this moment. Through silence this event can be shared by a 
multicultural medical staff. Silence allows individuals to personalize their practice while not 
imposing onto others. This act is a means of honoring a person’s last rite of passage and helps  
bring an element of the sacred back into the practice of medicine. 
Who can ask for a Pause? 
Any member of the team can request a Pause. 
When do I perform this Pause? 
In an attempted resuscitation situation, it is preferable to perform immediately after death is 
called. This allows for all involved in the care to share in the practice before leaving the room. 
After an expected death, it is also preferable that a Pause be initiatied soon after a patient’s 
death has been identified. 
If circumstances do not allow for an immediate Pause, this can be done at a later time. 
(Preferable to include all team members involved in care). 
If family is present, by all means invite them to be present during the practice. This increases 
the shared experience and gives them the opportunity to acknowledge their own loss. 
A Pause can be performed for a Donor prior to harvesting organs. 
A Pause can be performed for a recipient prior to and/or after an organ transplant. 
How is The Pause executed? 
Anyone can ask to initiate a Puase following a code/death. At first it may feel awkward because 
we are standing in a vulnerable place and asking for a moment of respect. Over time it becomes 
easier, because everyone involved understands how important this is. 
 
“Could we take a moment just to Pause and honor this person in the bed. (Insert person’s 
name) was someone who was alive and now has passed away. They were someone who loved 
and was loved. They were someone’s friend and family member. In our own way and in 
silence let us stand and take a moment to honor both this person in the bed and all the 
valiant efforts that were made on their behalf.” 
45 seconds to a minute of silence. 
“Thank you everyone.” 
 
Things to avoid: 
 The Pause is not a venue in which to proselytize. It is an attempt to allow a group of 
people with diverse practices and beliefs to share an experience of honoring both the 
life lost and the care team’s efforts. The language chosen is meant to universalize this 
experience. 
 Allow staff who are not comfortable with this practice to opt out of the actual Pause. 
(This is a silent moment of respect and if a team member has difficulty with this, further 
exploration may be warranted in order to facilitate support of that person either 
through employee assistance or peer counsel). 
 Avoid making this a policy/procedure; allow it to become naturally integrated into how 
things are done in your place of work. Once staff is empowered, the practice will grow 
organically. 
  





 Palliative Care COVID-19 management references 
 
University of Vermont Medical Center webinars: 
 
This module defines palliative care and hospice and when to utilize these specialty services. It also includes 
tips for goals of care conversations. 
 
This module features key symptom management for patients infected with COVID-19 and tips for end-of-
life care. 
 
 
 
 
